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FAILURES OF AMERICAN METHODS OF LAWMAKING IN HISTORICAL
AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES, by James R. Maxeiner,
Cambridge, 2018, ISBN 978-1-10719-815-9, 358 pp, $110.

Introduction
There is no riskier comparative-law activity than engaging in an
overall critical analysis of one’s own legal system using outside perspectives. The editor-in-chief of this Journal has had this experience,
receiving praise from the comparatists but meeting the silence of the
autochthone jurists: no review of his book was ever published, at
least in the targeted country. 1 The Journal of Civil Law Studies salutes the publication of James Maxeiner’ Failures of American Models of Lawmaking in Historical and Comparative Perspectives. It is
without a doubt a controversial work and we found no better way of
calling the attention of our readers to this highly stimulating book
than creating contrast. We had it reviewed by a United States-trained
scholar and by a bijural scholar trained in Germany and the United
States, hoping to bring a diversity of readers to the actual book and
generate rich and fertile discussions.
O.M.

1. OLIVIER MORÉTEAU, LE JURISTE FRANÇAIS ENTRE ETHNOCENTRISME ET
MONDIALISATION (Dalloz 2014).
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Review by Scott J. Burnham
I will never forget the introduction to statutes I got in law school.
My Contracts professor said at some point, “By the way, there’s this
thing called the Uniform Commercial Code in the Appendix to your
book. You might take a look at it some rainy day.” It seems like that
rainy day never came for a lot of lawyers and judges, for cases involving the sale of goods are still argued and opinions written without reference to U.C.C. Article 2. 1
Sometimes it seems like things have not changed all that much
in law schools since that day in my Contracts class some fifty years
ago. I recently heard of a Contracts professor who is so insistent on
teaching Contracts as common law that he deducts points from exam
answers if the student brings up the Article 2 rule, even where it is
applicable.
Some law schools regard Criminal Law as the antidote to the
heavy dose of common law, but my Criminal Law course was more
like a philosophy class. I remember at one point the professor expressed concern for our lack of statutory fundamentals, complaining exasperatedly, “You don’t know what the elements of homicide are?” My response, doubtless under my breath, was, “Hell, I
don’t even know what an element is.” Some law schools now require students to take a token short course in Legislation in the first
year, but whatever they are taught about statutes does not seem to
stick.
When conducting legal research, for example, even though
they know that courts have to follow applicable statutes, law students persist in first searching for a rule in the cases. If they do find
a statute, they are at a loss to say what the statute provides unless
there is a case telling them what the statute says. A statute is

1. See, e.g., Austin Instrument Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E. 2d 533 (N.Y.
1971); Rashid v. Jolly, 218 P.3d 499 (2009).
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apparently like a tree falling in the forest—it does not make a
sound unless a court is there to hear it. In Contracts, the first statute
students are likely to run into, U.C.C. section 2-207, is not a helpful
corrective, for it may well be a statute that does not mean anything
without a healthy dose of interpretation.
Indeed, Article 2 may be a poor introduction to statutes, for it
has been described as a “common law code.” Much of its application
depends on courts to flesh out the meaning of its weasel words. For
example, while section 2-302 allows a court to strike unconscionable terms or unconscionable contracts, there is little guidance in the
text or the Official Comments as to how to determine whether a term
is unconscionable. The statute only makes sense in light of its accreted common law application.
None of this would surprise James R. Maxeiner, whose Failures
of American Methods of Lawmaking in Historical and Comparative
Perspectives excoriates law schools for perpetuating the myth that
the law is found in the common law. The first half of Maxeiner’s
book is a welcome revisionist history. The party line has long been
that the United States has historically been a common law country,
and only recently have we entered “the age of statutes.” Maxeiner
points out convincingly that we have always been a nation of statutes, only creating the fabricated common law heritage in the late
nineteenth century under the influence of Oliver Wendell Holmes
and Christopher Columbus Langdell.
Maxeiner would prefer we laud notables such as David Dudley
Field, whose eponymous codes would have codified all of our law.
While Field was unsuccessful in getting his Civil Code adopted in
his native New York, it was adopted in California in 1872, followed
by adoption in several other states, not to mention Guam. Soon after
achieving statehood in 1889, Montana enacted its Civil Code, adopting practically wholesale the statutory scheme of California.
Although I had been taught this view of the primacy of the common law, I thought things might change when I began teaching at
the University of Montana. Surely, I thought, Montana, as a code
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state, would take a different approach to teaching contract law. I was
quickly disillusioned. Dean Jack Mudd told me that after he had
graduated from the law school and went to work as an associate in a
Montana law firm, one of his first assignments was to draft jury instructions in a contracts case. “Use the statutes for the instructions
on the law,” the partner told him. Only then did he discover that
Montana had a statutory scheme for contract law. His Contracts professor—the one I was hired to replace—had never mentioned the
code.
On some level this made sense, for most law schools aspire to
be national in their reputations. Thus, they would not be so provincial as to teach the law of the particular jurisdiction in which they
were located. But Mudd had the insight that the Montana School of
Law was not The Little Harvard of the West, and as the only law
school in the state, it could have the courage to be true to itself as
the Montana law school. In accord with Mudd’s view that we should
be doing a better job to prepare students for the practice of law, I
decided to incorporate these statutes into my teaching. Even if a
graduate did not practice in Montana, I thought students would find
the skills of working with statutes to be of value.
But how do you teach statutes? I have taught U.S. law in civil
law countries and found that the answer is often rote memorization.
U.S. law students apply the law to the facts and to hypothetical facts
from the first day of law school, and while this method may often
lead to the unhappy conclusion that law is indeterminable, it also
leads to the collection of skills that go by the shorthand of “thinking
like a lawyer.” If graduates use those skills to practice law, will they
really find it so hard to discover common law rules? They will have
to find precedents, which their legal research skills (which Maxeiner
disparages) should enable them to do efficiently. Because courts follow precedents, they can pretty well predict what the outcome will
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be—unless the facts are so different that the rule should not apply.
Which, to come full circle, is a strength of the common law system. 2
Even for those students who end up not practicing law, the critical reasoning skills are doubtless valuable. These skills are valuable
because the rules, whether found in the common law or a code,
rarely mean anything without a context. And the context in which
they are applied is a case. When I put together my own materials to
teach Contracts, I vowed that I would never use a case merely to
extract a rule. If that is all the case is for, then we might as well just
give students the rule, just as we would give them a statute. The
value of the case is in analyzing the application of that rule to a particular fact situation.
Here Maxeiner and the civilians might say, “Hold on a second—
in that last paragraph you spoke of a rule ‘found in the common law’
and you said you would instead ‘give students the rule.’ But you
can’t do that because unlike the civil law, the common law cannot
be found—no one knows what it is. You can’t give it to them because it is buried in the past cases and has to be extracted.” Maxeiner
likes to blast the myths of the common law, but isn’t this one of the
myths of the civil law—that, unlike the common law, code law is
readily available? I am especially fond of the optimistic comment of
Wilbur F. Sanders, a proponent of Montana’s codification of the
law:
[A] citizen of Montana, who has but little money to spend on
books, needs to have lying on his table but three: an English
Dictionary to teach [him] the knowledge of his own mother
tongue; this Book of the Law [the Civil Code], to show him
his rights as a member of civilized society; and the good old
Family Bible to teach him his duties to God and to man. 3
2. Another weakness of codes is their inflexibility, freezing the law at a particular stage of development. For example, prior to 1979, the Montana Code included Field Code § 13, which provided that “Persons of unsound mind, within
the meaning of this code, are idiots, lunatics, imbeciles, and habitual drunkards.”
Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 64-104 (repealed 1979).
3. HENRY M. FIELD, THE LIFE OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 92 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 1898) (quoting Wilbur F. Sanders), quoted in Andrew P. Morriss, Scott
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As to the availability of the common law rules, I suspect that for
as long as there has been common law, there have been scholars and
entrepreneurs who provided us with the short cut of extracting the
pure metal rules from the ore of the past decisions. In England, this
function was served by Coke and Blackstone. In the United States
today, it is served by the Restatements. By giving the students a Restatement principle, I am giving them a shortcut (and a powerful
disclaimer needs to be added as to the limitations of this shortcut) to
the common law. Thus, the common law rules are readily available.
Maxeiner does not have a kind word to say about U.S. legal education, with which he has apparently been bound in an unhappy
marriage for many years. He mentions that in the German system,
the judges apply the facts to the law to come to a conclusion (where
there is no jury involved, I fail to see how this system differs from
the U.S. system). He then makes the amazing statement that German
law students learn how to do this after they graduate from law
school! So, what have they done in law school? One can only hazard
the guess that they have spent their time memorizing codes in order
to learn the law. But what is the point of that if the law is so readily
accessible and knowable?
In any event, I have my doubts that the rules are easy to find in
a code. Let’s say I am teaching contract formation. If I go to the
Montana Civil Code, section 28-2-102(4) tells me that for a contract
we need “a sufficient cause or consideration.” 4 What is that? Section
28-2-801 provides:
What constitutes good consideration. Any benefit conferred or agreed to be conferred upon the promisor by any
other person, to which the promisor is not lawfully entitled,
or any prejudice suffered or agreed to be suffered by the person, other than prejudice that the person is at the time of consent lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the

J. Burnham & James C. Nelson, Debating the Field Civil Code 105 Years Late,
61 Mont. L. Rev. 371, 380 (2000).
4. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-102(4) (2019).
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promisor is a good consideration for a promise. 5
This is a helpful definition of consideration, and we can unpack
it with profit. But to really get a grip on it, we need some context.
Cases like Hamer v. Sidway, 6 Kirksey v. Kirksey, 7 Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon, 8 and hypotheticals like “Williston’s Tramp”9
are staples of first-year law study for good reason—they give us the
context to make the rule meaningful. After wrestling with such
cases, I think U.S. law students get a pretty good sense of how to
concoct and identify this mysterious glue that binds contracts together. In fact, didn’t Mr. Field derive his rule by synthesizing
cases? So, it would seem that study of the cases gives us both the
rule and also a better understanding of the rule since we have seen
its application in context.
Let’s now go back to the rule we found in the Montana Code.
Having acquired a working knowledge of consideration from the
Code definition, we are only halfway to understanding that element
of contract formation, for section 28-1-102 mentioned “cause” as an
alternative to consideration. Where is its definition? Alas, it disappears from the Code after that initial mention. Curious about what it
is, I found a law review article on the topic. 10 Tracking the long history of cause, Professor Keyes seems to define it as the absence of
consideration. Curiously, in the more than 150 years since that statute was adopted in California, no attorney seems to have argued, “I
may not have consideration for this contract, but I don’t need it because according to the California Civil Code, I can have cause as an
alternative.” I’m not sure if the reason for this gap is because this
5. Id. at § 28-2-801 (derived from Field Civ. C. § 780).
6. Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
7. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
8. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917); see also
Scott J. Burnham, Understated Elegance: Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, in The Best and Worst of Contracts Decisions: An Anthology, 45 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 889, 907 (2018).
9. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 7:18 (2018).
10. William Noel Keyes, Cause and Consideration in California—A Re-Appraisal, 47 CAL. L. REV. 74 (1959).
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particular code has provided us with a red herring, or because
Maxeiner is right that we denigrate codes as a source of law.
On many occasions I have been frustrated by the Montana
Code as a source of law because I have seen how courts can manipulate it, often cherry-picking inapplicable statutes in order to
reach a desired result. An egregious example is Miller v. Fallon
County. 11 One of the issues in Miller was the enforceability of an
exculpatory clause. This seems to me a difficult issue for a code to
deal with, because enforceability depends on so many variables. A
statute could easily outlaw exculpatory clauses for personal injury,
as is the case in Louisiana, perhaps not coincidentally a civil law
jurisdiction. 12 But that solution seems to go too far, for the common law sensibly says that exculpatory clauses have a place in private ordering where there is a negotiated contract in an area that
lacks public interest.
In an excellent example of common law analysis, Tunkl v.
Board of Regents, 13 the California Supreme Court determined that
an exculpatory clause was not enforceable when entered into by a
patient seeking hospital services. The court then laid down factors—though these work better as elements—for courts to examine
in order to determine application of the rule in various contexts.14
Using these factors, California courts later determined, for example, that an exculpatory clause was not enforceable in a residential
lease but was enforceable in an agreement between a professional
driver and a race track. 15 This seems to me an example of the common law at its best. I am not sure how a code could deal with these
subtleties.
11. Miller v. Fallon County, 721 P. 2d 342 (Mont. 1986).
12. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2004 (2018).
13. Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal.
1963).
14. See Scott J. Burnham, Are You Free to Contract Away Your Right to
Bring a Negligence Claim?, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379 (2014).
15. See, e.g., Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 573 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1978);
Nat’l & Int’l Brotherhood of Street Racers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App.
3d 934 (1989).
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Now the scene switches to Montana. In Haynes v. County of
Missoula, 16 a case where the exculpatory clause was found in the
entry form that an exhibitor signed when entering an exhibit in the
Missoula County Fair, the Supreme Court of Montana first examined the Code provisions on illegality, and correctly found that a
provision is not illegal unless it is contrary to the public interest. In
order to determine the extent of public interest in this case, the Court
looked at the test laid out in Tunkl, and determined that, while the
case was close, there was sufficient public interest in a county fair
that the exculpatory clause was not enforceable. One may disagree
with the outcome, but it is hard to find fault with the analysis as an
example of common law reasoning.
A few years later, in Miller v. Fallon County, 17 the same court
was faced with the issue of the enforceability of an exculpatory
clause that had been signed by the wife of a long-distance truck
driver in order to secure permission from the trucking company to
accompany her husband on his travels. I don’t think there would be
much doubt that application of the Tunkl test would lead to enforceability, so the Court, determined to find for the plaintiff, had to take
a different route. It ignored the Tunkl test used as precedent in
Haynes, and instead looked to the statutes on illegality. It found this
one:
Contracts that violate policy of law—exemption from responsibility—exception. Except as provided in 27-1753, all contracts that have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for the person’s
own fraud, for willful injury to the person or property of another, or for violation of law, whether willful or negligent,
are against the policy of the law. 18
Well, the court reasoned, this statute says that it is illegal to put
in a contract a provision that is contrary to law, so let us ask, what
16. Haynes v. County of Missoula, 517 P.2d 370 (Mont. 1973).
17. Miller, 721 P. 2d 342, supra note 11.
18. MONT. CODE ANN., supra note 4, at § 28-2-702 (derived from Field Civ.
C. § 828).
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is law? It includes tort law, which says we aren’t supposed to commit
torts without facing consequences. So, it must be illegal to put in a
contract that one may commit a tort without consequence. Thus, the
exculpatory clause is illegal—as are all exculpatory clauses. The appreciation for context, for different results in different situations,
which characterized the common law analysis of the issue in Tunkl,
is gone, replaced by the inflexible rule derived from a code. A common law court could have come to the same conclusion, but along the
way to that conclusion it would have had to show us why it was
against the public interest to allow the exculpatory clause in this context.
As another example of the difficulty of codifying a complex rule,
the Montana court does not like the finality of worker’s compensation
settlements when the injuries turn out to have been greater than the
parties thought they were at the time of settlement. Historically, one
of the best tools to attack such a settlement is the doctrine of mutual
mistake. In Kienas v. Peterson, 19 for example, the Court found the
settlement voidable on grounds of mistake but conveniently omitted
discussion of the issue of whether the claimant had assumed the risk
of being mistaken.
In a later case, Wolfe v. Webb, 20 the Court had to face that issue,
since the settlement contained clear language indicating that it would
be binding even though the parties were mistaken about the extent of
the injuries. The Court took a close look at the Code rule on mistake.
Section 28-2-102 tells us that the parties have to consent to the contract, and section 28-2-301 tells us the consent has to be free. 21 Section 28-2-401 tells us that consent is not free when obtained through
mistake. 22
What is mistake? Section 28-2-409 tells us:
What constitutes mistake of fact. Mistake of fact is a
19.
20.
21.
22.

Kienas v. Peterson, 624 P.2d 1 (Mont. 1980).
Wolfe v. Webb, 824 P.2d 240 (Mont. 1992).
MONT. CODE ANN., supra note 4, at §§ 28-2-102(2), 28-2-301(1).
Id. at § 28-2-401(e).
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mistake not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part
of the person making the mistake and consisting in:
(1) an unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact,
past or present, material to the contract; or
(2) belief in the present existence of a thing material to the
contract which does not exist or in the past existence of such
a thing which has not existed. 23
Where is the rule that a mistake has to be mutual or the rule that
one can accept the risk of being mistaken? There are no such rules
in Mr. Field’s code! Therefore, when there is mistake, there is no
consent, and when there is no consent, there is no contract. This
analysis seems correct on the face of the Code, which leaves out an
important element of mistake—assumption of the risk of being mistaken—that distinguishes it from the other defenses. And rather than
read that omission into the Code, the court was content to use the
omission when it served its purposes.
If the law is more accessible when found in the form of a code,
these examples certainly don’t demonstrate it. Maxeiner might argue that these problems are traceable to the way this Code is drafted,
though he does not have a negative word to say about the Field
Code. More likely, he would argue that the problem is traceable to
the way it has been employed by users unfamiliar with a code system. To illustrate the advantage of a code system, in the second half
of the book Maxeiner gives us a concrete comparison of two legal
systems, the German and the American.
The book comes alive for a moment at the beginning of this comparative section when, to illustrate his point, he uses the hypothetical
of a person who wishes to know the applicable law in order to drive
a horse trailer across the country. In Germany, there is only one body
of law to look to. In the United States, the laws are found in interstate
commerce law as well as in the laws of various states and counties,
much of it hard to find. Actually, the example may be even more
complex than Maxeiner indicates, for our traveler would no doubt

23. Id. at § 28-2-409 (derived from Field Civ. C. § 762).
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pass through Indian Country, and those jurisdictions have their own
laws that may well differ from the law of the state in which the reservation is located.
This example lets us down, however, because most of the relevant law is regulatory—it is found in statutes rather than in the common law. The example, therefore, does not demonstrate the superiority of statutes to the common law; it demonstrates a weakness of
American federalism. When each jurisdiction is permitted to have
its own law, it can indeed be difficult to plan a multistate transaction.
But isn’t this weakness of federalism also a strength? Why
should the horse law of Montana, where horses are used recreationally and in ranch work, be the same as the horse law of Pennsylvania, where horse-drawn buggies are a common mode of transportation in some communities, or the same as the horse law of Kentucky,
where horses are bred commercially?
Rather than furthering his argument that code law is superior to
common law, Maxeiner’s example instead launches a new argument—that much of U.S. statutory law is not code law at all, for the
statutes lack the integrity found in a true code. The case of the U.S.
Code being merely a dog’s breakfast of assembled and sometimes
contradictory statutes is the prime example. Again, I am convinced,
and anyone would agree that where we do have codes, we should
have workable codes.
Much of this section on codes is given over to a dry survey of
the German code scheme, again with few examples. It appears that
the vaunted German efficiency extends to their codes as well.
Maxeiner tells us “In Germany finding governing laws is easy and
unproblematic. Minutes, not days or hours, are required.” I decided
to test this proposition by seeing if I could find answers in the German code to the problems that puzzled me in my use of the Montana
Code: 1) What is consideration—or more broadly, what is required
for an enforceable contract? 2) Will a contract be avoided for mistake when a party has assumed the risk of being mistaken? 3) When
will an exculpatory clause be enforced?
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I had no trouble finding the German Civil Code (BGB). 24 Here
is what I found during my inquiry:
1. Consideration. In my search for how the German code deals
with consideration, I found that Title 3, Contract, Sections 145 et
seq., jumps right into offer and acceptance but omits discussion of
any other element of formation. I then did a word search for consideration and found that there are provisions that talk about consideration in a context very much like the U.S. conception of it. For example, Section 316 seems similar to U.S. law that provides for what
to do when no price is stated in the contract. 25 It provides:
“Specification of consideration. If the extent of the consideration
promised for an act of performance is not specified, then in case of
doubt the party that is owed the consideration is entitled to make the
specification.” 26
This provision assumes consideration, yet I see no earlier provision that goes to the heart of the question—which promises is our
society going to enforce, and if it is going to enforce those that are
supported by consideration, then what is consideration?
2. Mistake. It was easy to find the provision addressing mistake.
Section 119 provides:
Voidability for mistake. (1) A person who, when making a
declaration of intent, was mistaken about its content or had
no intention whatsoever of making a declaration with this
content, may avoid the declaration if it is to be assumed that
he would not have made the declaration with knowledge of
the factual position and with a sensible understanding of the
case. 27
Without more, I am not sure this section answers my question.
Is a person “mistaken about its contents” when he enters a contract
to settle a claim for injuries for $10,000 when his injuries in fact

24. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code], translation at https://
perma.cc/W4AJ-Y3MC (Ger.).
25. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-305.
26. BGB § 316 (Ger.).
27. Id. at § 119.
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amount to $100,000, but he does not know that at the time? And can he
agree to accept the risk of being mistaken? If this section is merely a
starting point for analysis, then it would seem we are in the same position
we would be in if researching the question under a common law regime.
3. Exculpatory clause. It was also easy to find Section 309 on prohibited clauses:
Prohibited clauses without the possibility of evaluation.
Even to the extent that a deviation from the statutory provisions is permissible, the following are ineffective in standard
business terms:
7. (Exclusion of liability for injury to life, body or health and
in case of gross fault)
a) (Injury to life, body or health) [A]ny exclusion or limitation of liability for damage from injury to life, body or health
due to negligent breach of duty by the user or intentional or
negligent breach of duty by a legal representative or a person
used to perform an obligation of the user;
b) (Gross fault) any exclusion or limitation of liability for
other damage arising from a grossly negligent breach of duty
by the user or from an intentional or grossly negligent breach
of duty by a legal representative of the user or a person used
to perform an obligation of the user . . . . 28
This provision seems to answer our questions about the enforceability of an exculpatory clause. Section 305 defines “standard business terms” similarly to how U.S. law defines a contract of adhesion,
so this provision, like the common law cases discussed earlier, distinguishes between an exculpatory clause in a contract of adhesion
and in a negotiated contract. It prohibits the clause only in the former, leaving the implication that it would be enforceable in the latter. Similar to the U.S. cases, it appears to prohibit clauses that exculpate from gross negligence or intentional torts. In the area of simple negligence, it seems to prohibit all exculpatory clauses, without
consideration of whether the activity is in the public interest. One
can argue that that is an overly inclusive prohibition, but one cannot
argue that it is not clear.
28. Id. at § 309.
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It is quite possible that my search for answers in the German code
scheme reflects my own inadequacies rather than those of the code. However, my limited goal was to test Maxeiner’s proposition that I could find
the answers in minutes. My search results indicate that the German code
may not be as simple to access as Maxeiner would have us believe.29
In conclusion, Maxeiner has convinced me that in the United States,
we have long lived in an age of statutes. He has also convinced me that
these statutes are not as well written or organized as some of the codes
he admires, especially those of Germany. But he has not convincingly
made the argument that I expected him to make—that codes are preferable to common law.
Coincidentally, I recently read another book that draws comparisons
between U.S. law and German law—James Q. Whitman’s Hitler’s
American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law
(2017) I was particularly struck by a short passage in Whitman’s conclusion. I knew that Franklin D. Roosevelt felt stymied because he believed
the national emergency of the depression demanded rapid change in the
law that the Supreme Court would not permit. What I did not know was
that Nazi jurists felt the same way about the national emergency in Germany. If only we were not restricted by our codes, they thought. If only
we had a common law system like that in the U.S. where the judges could
make the law needed to meet the emergency.30 That insight caused me
more apprehension about the common law than anything in Maxeiner’s
entire book.

Scott J. Burnham
Gonzaga University School of Law
29. I am grateful for the assistance of Dlovan Schlato, a student at Gonzaga
University School of Law and a graduate of Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn. Ms. Schlato advises me that one would never rely solely on the
Code but would also consult the Commentary (Kommentar)—advice that
Maxeiner did not provide.
30. See JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED
STATES AND THE MAKING OF NAZI RACE LAW 153–58 (Princeton U. Press 2017).
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Review by Markus G. Puder
James Maxeiner’s book makes a welcome contribution to the
conversation about comparative law in the United States. It truly is
a great read—not only because of its provocative contents but also
because of its personal tone.
The thread of the book is clear from the outset. Functional societies are predicated on a government of laws. America’s legal system is broken. Germany has a working legal system. Maxeiner organizes his storyline into a historical part, which establishes the
American baseline, and a comparative part, which juxtaposes the
American and the German experiences, including a creative case
study. From the vast array of topics raised by Maxeiner, instructors
could easily tier a complement of stand-alone modules for purposes
of creating a full course in comparative law. Those interested might
find the architecture of the book coupled with the wealth of references immensely helpful for such an endeavor.
Maxeiner’s book, rich in themes deserving of dialogue, does not
shrink from vigorous debate. You do not have to agree with the author in every instance. Ultimately, it is all about leaving the echo
chamber that appears to increasingly parochialize our comparative
law. For example, I was recently privy to a conversation between
two practitioners about a legal transplant. When it came to the question of what the model actually said in the language of the donor
system, one of the interlocutors asserted that “there are translations.”
But what if the translation is inaccurate? What might the client of
that attorney say or do in such a case? As I have experienced in the
context of my own bilingual (English-German) edition of the Louisiana Civil Code, 1 the comparative legal academy has become much
narrower than it used to be when it comes to law and language. In a

1. MARKUS G. PUDER, DAS ZIVILGESETZBUCH VON LOUISIANA:
ZWEISPRACHIGE ERSTAUSGABE MIT EINER EINLEITUNG (Nomos 2017).
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similar vein, too many comparative law journals in the United States
consider the dyad of legal translation and comparative law, or comparative law and legal translation, a topic too specific for their readership. In an increasingly smaller world, this posture seems peculiar
at best. 2 During the plurilingual and plurijural days of Louisiana, our
most illustrious jurists were masters of the art of bridging law and
language.
Similarly, whether the common law system or the civil law system is “superior” is not the point—reasonable people may reasonably differ in their views. But the conversation about both systems
must be had and it must continue. Comparative law is a living and
breathing creature. In mixed jurisdictions we know this all too well.
Take, for example, the Louisiana trust. 3 To this day, the literature
and the jurisprudence offer different models of explication when it
comes to reconciling the common law notions of formal and beneficial title with Louisiana’s unitary conception of ownership. Moreover, Louisiana needed to mollify its rule of immediate vesting and
remove the trust from the prohibition of substitutions. Arguably,
Louisiana has managed to split the atom by offering a body of trust
law that is fully functional within the American Union.
Another important theme raised by Maxeiner involves codified
law and codifications. Again, there is much room for fruitful dialogue. Significantly, a code is not a code in the United States. From
a Louisiana perspective, our code is “harder” than the codes more
fully discussed by Maxeiner. The Louisiana Civil Code embodies
the solemn expression of the legislature. While jurisprudence continues to fill and push the limits of the principles féconds en
conséquences, courts are bound by the legislated law of the code.
Especially in the wake of our civilian Renaissance, which took hold
in the 1960s, Louisiana state courts and federal Erie courts have
2. Markus G. Puder, Law and Language in Action—Transformative Experiences Associated with Translating the Louisiana Civil Code into German, 84
RABELSZ (forthcoming 2020).
3. Markus G. Puder & Anton D. Rudokvas, How Trust-Like Is Russia’s Fiduciary Management? Answers from Louisiana, 79 LA. L. REV. 1071 (2019).
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stayed the course. Understandably though, courts are rightfully irked
when the legislature in turn resorts to “fixing” specific judicial decisions deemed not true to a particular redactor’s preferred reading
of the law. In Louisiana, this occurred, for example, in the context
of a controversy over Louisiana’s law of fixtures (“attachments”). 4
In contrast to the Louisiana Civil Code, California’s Civil Code,
meanwhile quite aged, offers a snapshot of the ambient common law
of the time. Significantly, the code embraces the common law process and method of moving the law forward. Both features have encouraged the judiciary to be more assertive when it comes to abrogating and replacing codal law. For example, California’s Supreme
Court took it upon itself to replace by judicial fiat contributory with
comparative negligence even in the face of the properly construed
codal text.
Codes also differ in their style, transparency and readability.
Germany’s Civil Code is basically written for professional lawyers.
It is replete with legalisms. Laypersons therefore face the basic challenge of understanding its legal terminology and drafting technique.
In contrast, with its down-to-earth tone and accessible vocabulary,
the Swiss Civil Code is probably the most user-friendly codification
in the German law and language sphere. In Louisiana, the difference
among the redactors taking ownership of portions of the document,
as it continues to be revised in waves, has resulted in numerous stylistic and substantive fissures. Redactors have frequently brought
their indigenous and disparate cultures of origin to bear. This makes
the Louisiana Civil Code not only a challenging but also a voluminous document, even if core areas of private law, such as the Trust
Code and the Children’s Code, are housed elsewhere.
Finally, Maxeiner makes no bones about his preference for Germany’s approach to a government of laws. Might this reflect his experience of learning from one of the revered teachers and scholars

4. MARKUS G. PUDER, JOHN A. LOVETT & EVELYN L. WILSON, LOUISIANA
PROPERTY LAW (forthcoming 2020).
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at the Ludwig-Maximilians University in Munich—the late Professor Wolfgang Fikentscher? In the context of the functionality of
Germany’s system, one more observation comes to mind. The arrival of the European Union, with its regulatory rage (Regelungswut)
and governance paradigm of commandeering progressively expanding areas of competence, has dramatically altered trajectories towards a government of laws in Europe, including Germany. The debates about curvature of the cucumber (Krümmung der Gurke) has
become the emblematic image for this proposition. Time for a sequel, Prof. Maxeiner? Sis felix!
Markus G. Puder
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law

